The most recent quarterly report from the special inspector general of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) shows the terrible truth that taxpayer-bailed-out banks have rejected nearly three-quarters of applications for a government-backed and much-touted mortgage loan re-structuring program.
The third-quarter report for fiscal year 2015, released in July, shows that the banks turned down 72 percent of those seeking foreclosure through the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). That figure certainly comes as no surprise to those of us who have been fighting a maddening battle with our banks’ “loss mitigation” departments, which seem to be on a mission to increase that denial rate instead of help homeowners restructure their loans in the face of ongoing economic challenges often not of their own making.
When the Making Home Affordable initiative was launched in early 2009, it was supposed to help up to 9 million homeowners keep their homes. HAMP itself was supposed to help 3 million to 4 million homeowners by extending their loan terms, decreasing their interest rates and reducing principal. (The first two sometimes happened; the third, not so much.)
In spite of having its drop-dead date extended three times, most recently through December 2016, HAMP has utterly failed to meet this goal. U.S. Treasury Department statistics kept since January 2009 – about seven months after President Obama announced HAMP’s launch – show of 5.7 million homeowners who applied for mortgage relief through the department’s “cornerstone” mortgage relief program, more than 4 million were rejected as of April 2015.
Odd, isn’t it, that those statistics don’t show up headlined in Treasury’s press archive? Nothing but sweetness and light there. Not unlike the department’s most recent quarterly report on Making Home Affordable, the umbrella under which HAMP operates. The headline tells such a positive tale: More than 2.3 Million Homeowner Assistance Actions have taken place under Making Home Affordable (MHA) programs. Nary a mention of those 5.8 million denied HAMP applications. Can’t you feel your head spin?
My state, Arizona, which was consistently counted among the top three “hardest-hit” foreclosure states, had a 68 percent denial rate. Of just over 172,000 applications, fewer than 55,000 homeowners were granted “trial” modifications – assigned a three-month reduced payment plan that, if successfully completed, was supposed to lead to a permanent modification.
That in spite of being granted an extra $125 million federal allocation from the Hardest Hit Fund intended to “provide assistance of up to $50,000 to qualified homeowners to create an affordable and sustainable mortgage payment through a permanent principal reduction modification.” (Sadly, the program proved just another farce.)
Three of the top seven servicers participating in MHA, Citi, Chase and Bank of America, all had staggering HAMP trial plan denial rates – above 80 percent. My servicer, Wells Fargo, did better with “only” 60 percent denial.
Note that for the first quarter of 2015, the Treasury Department’s mortgage servicing survey found that Chase and BofA needed only “minor improvement” and Citi and Wells Fargo needed “moderate improvement” in their compliance with the quite specific HAMP servicing standards supposedly administered by the department. Such a gift for understatement those Treasury officials have. Not, however, a gift for ensuring that banks act to make programs like HAMP actually work for the people they’re supposed to serve.
According to the SIGTARP quarterly report:
“Congress created SIGTARP to prevent vulnerabilities for fraud, waste, and abuse in TARP, improve TARP’s efficiency and effectiveness, and enforce the law where fraud has seeped in.
“SIGTARP’s 176 recommendations are designed to protect TARP programs and dollars. But they can only provide that protection if Treasury implements them. Treasury, however, has failed to implement 104 of SIGTARP’s 176 recommendations, losing opportunities to make a difference.”
Later in the report, this conclusion that will come as no surprise to anyone who has tried to secure a loan mod: “Some of SIGTARP’s most significant unimplemented recommendations to Treasury address problems in HAMP …”
The HAMP guidelines, most of which have been in place since shortly after the MHA programs were launched in early 2008, were reiterated four years later as detailed standards specified in the much-touted National Mortgage Settlement. But, Treasury seems to deliberately avoid making the MHA programs work effectively an efficiently, a fact that clearly frustrates current TARP Special Investigator General Christy Romero as much as it did the first SIGTARP, Neil Barofksy. Plenty of American homeowners – and former homeowners – know just how you feel, Ms. Romero.
No wonder I’m seeing an up-tick in traffic on my blog, website and facebook page. I’ve heard from people in their fifth year of fighting the bank and no matter how much paperwork they submit or how much research they have done to confirm that they do, indeed, meet the publish criteria for a HAMP mod, the bank keeps faking reasons to refuse.
Not surprising that people are seeking outlets to tell their stories, if only to confirm that they 1) aren’t losing their minds and 2) aren’t the only ones being totally jerked around by huge corporations that should operate with some level of professionalism and ethics
Consider this post on a seemingly inactive foreclosure prevention company’s site. The original complaint against Wells Fargo was posted in February 2008. Scroll down and you’ll find 112 comments posted over four-and-a-half years – an eternity in Web time. You’ll see most of those 112 posters tell similar tales: either same story, same bank or same story, different bank.
The the two SIGs have been reporting many of the same things we’ve all been saying since 2008, and doing it in clear, readable documents backed up with clear statistical analysis illustrated with informative graphics. So it’s not as if anyone who wanted to understand the problems and get sensible advice on effective fixes doesn’t have access to the necessary information.
The truth remains: the big banks have no intention of dealing fairly with distressed homeowners seeking to restructure their mortgage loans and nobody with the power to stop the banks has any intention of changing this.