Wells Fargo Executives Embarrassed by Employee Incompetence?

Poor Wells Fargo. It must be really distressing to CEO John Stumpf that his mortgage division is being called on the carpet yet again.

Big Banks’ Mortgage Units — Still Failing Customers — Face New Restrictions
On Wednesday, the OCC announced that six banks that manage home loans — EverBank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, Santander Bank, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo — haven’t implemented all the reforms they promised to make as part of the 2011 deals.

As punishment, the regulator has imposed new restrictions on the banks’ mortgage departments, limiting their ability to acquire residential servicing rights in some circumstances, and forcing them to seek OCC approval before hiring senior officers in their mortgage servicing and compliance departments.

The restrictions vary, with Wells Fargo and HSBC strictly prohibited from certain types of new business acquisition, while the other banks must first seek OCC approval.

Let’s face it, things must be very obviously bad if the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has finally taken its head out of the sand and noticed something was wrong with the way Wells and the other big financial institutions deal with consumer requests for mortgage loan modifications in the wake of a past “enforcement action” and a so-called punitive settlement that set servicing guidelines for the banks.

One of the many issues cited when the OCC sanctioned Wells and others last week was the ongoing inability of the bank to assign each loan mod review to a single, knowledgeable employee tasked with, among other things, keeping the consumer informed throughout the process.

Wells Fargo, the OCC said in a new consent order, “continues to engage in unsafe and unsound practices.” Among the bank’s points of “noncompliance,” the regulator said in regulator-speak, is its failure to ensure “effective communication with borrowers, both oral and written.”

According to the OCC, Wells Fargo still has yet to ensure that each borrower is matched with a single customer service representative at the bank to handle their modification request or foreclosure — a basic first step to ending the cycle of confusion, lost paperwork and endless hours on the phone that many homeowners have endured while speaking with a succession of uninformed bank employees.

Mike Heid, the president of Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, said in a statement that the bank has “implemented significant changes to our mortgage servicing operations and achieved compliance with major elements of the original Consent Order.”

I would imagine Stumpf and Heid must just be beside themselves with shame and distress because none of the many hundreds of company executives is intelligent enough to set up a system to assign cases to the employees trained and empowered to manage them. You’d think the nation’s largest mortgage bank and second-largest mortgage servicer could afford to hire somebody to help with that.

How embarrassing for Heid and other WFHM executives who have been telling no less an auspicious audience than the U.S. Congress since April 2010 that the company is diligently working on creating what has become known as a “single point of contact” system. How distressing that the no-doubt earnest testimony of those well-paid men was made into lies by the base incompetence of those idiot employees who, after years and years of being paid salaries still can’t manage to create a database and develop a protocol for working with consumers.

More than five years later, they have to hang their heads in shame that they can’t manage to do what countless private and government organizations do every day – assign clients, patients, students, etc., to a contact person they can count on to help them through a bureaucratic process.

Back when I worked in a tiny academic advising office at a small university, we somehow managed to create and administer a system that could divvy up the students among trained advisors, maintain an electronic database to record  every communication we had with those students, and track their academic progress and choice of major. Little did I know back then that we lowly functionaries were geniuses compared to the high-dollar executives at the nation’s fourth-largest bank.

While I was trying to work with Wells Fargo to restructure my loan, I experienced the terrible incompetence of its system firsthand. Over two and a half years, I was assigned no fewer than 17 people who were supposed to help get my case reviewed. Oddly enough, most of them weren’t very helpful at all. Some of them even seemed to completely lack such basic skills as how to read a bank statement, how to add simple numbers and how to return phone calls.

One wonders how the very same company has managed to keep the paperwork straight and organize all the steps required to facilitate the hundreds of thousands of foreclosures it has committed over the past few years. Of course, we now know there was a special manual created to help Wells Fargo employees fabricate the reams of documents necessary to achieve this profitable outcome.

Perhaps Stumpf and Heid could hire the same people who wrote the Foreclosure Manual to create a Loan Mod Manual. Wouldn’t that be helpful? I wonder why none of their expensive executives thought of that?

Why Banks Treat Mortgage Borrowers So Badly

Just in case you’re still wondering why the big banks are engaged in a seemingly insatiable foreclosure feeding frenzy, this article on MSNBC’s Economy Watch about the blatant and ongoing paperwork fraud at Wells Fargo pretty much sums it up.

“Companies that manage mortgages typically collect only a small fee for each loan that is current. But loans in foreclosure generate a laundry list of foreclosure-related revenues, including legal fees, late charges, back interest, home inspections and maintenance. Last year, Wells Fargo earned $3.3 billion in profits from its mortgage servicing business, or about 20 percent of the bank’s total net income, according to its annual report.”

Most logical, ethical people have a real problem understanding why  bank executives seem to think it makes any sense except in very limited circumstances to foreclose, leave a house sitting derelict and then eventually sell it for way less than the original homeowner’s mortgage.  Why, we wonder, don’t the banks work with their borrowers who want to pay but are in temporary difficulties simply to re-structure their mortgage loans? Why does it seem that the big banks like Wells Fargo go out of their way to work against borrowers?

Most people are well aware that the modified mortgage is going to cost them more in the long run – lower payments today translate into longer terms and more interest. And wouldn’t the banks end up making more, too? How is that not an incentive for Wells Fargo and the rest of the big banks to enthusiastically help their mortgage customers instead of playing insidious little paperwork games, refusing to return calls or answer letters, and even outright lying to get out of modifying mortgages?

To fully understand how completely messed up the relationship between homeowners and banks has become, those of us who have mortgages need to stop thinking of ourselves as the banks’ customers. Just because you exercised your right to chose which bank with which to initiate the mortgage on your home, you shouldn’t make the mistake of thinking that bank still thinks it owes you any of the courtesies generally expected by customers.

Why? Because without your consent or even your knowledge, your bank sold you out. Or at least it sold your loan to an undisclosed “investor” or “investors.” During the mortgage boom, this probably happened before the ink was even dry on those pages and pages of legalese you signed at closing. (And there’s some evidence showing up that your loan might have been sold multiple times, which should be a big no-no!)

The investor doesn’t know you, nor did it have anything to do with creating the structure of your loan. It (whether it’s another bank or an investment fund of some kind) is only interested in your loan as part of a package deal purchased from a bank in a speculative venture, a sort of bet that it will make more money collecting the interest on all those mortgages than it paid the bank up front for the bundled loans.

But the investor doesn’t necessarily have the desire or the organizational resources to do the boring administrative tasks associated with collecting those payments. Enter the “loan servicer,” the entity formerly known as the bank you think of as your mortgage lender.

But wait, you say, I’m still making my mortgage payments to that same bank I chose when I went looking for a mortgage. What do you mean they don’t own the loan?!

What your bank did was contract with the entity (or entities, who knows?) to which your loan was sold for the right to “service” that loan. That means, in simple terms, that the bank performs administrative tasks such as sending out payment notices and processing incoming payments as a service to the investor. For a fee.

Sounds benign, right? But look closer at what happened here. All of a sudden, you went from being a bank’s valued customer to being, well, a number. After your bank sold your loan and contracted back the servicing rights, the investor became the bank’s customer. Not you.

And the investor has no clue who you are. Your loan is just one of a list of numbers in a whole block of loans bought based on a set of criteria such as geographic region, length of term and age of the loan. The investor’s customers are its shareholders or the people who have pooled their money into some kind of fund, such as a retirement plan. Not you.

So, are you starting to understand just how well and truly you got screwed in this little scenario? And why the bank employees treat you like you are dirt. Or invisible. Or stupid.

That’s because you the homeowner are, to put it rather bluntly, just like a cow kept only to give milk. As long as you keep putting out (paying your mortgage every month), everything is probably just fine and you go on blissfully unaware that your bank has stopped considering you a valued customer. But stop giving milk/paying your mortgage for any reason and you find out pretty quick that your status isn’t what you thought. You’re ripe for abuse and/or neglect, but not for aid and assistance.

Ummm. You do know what happens to cows that stop giving milk, right? No, they do not retire to green fields to live out their days in peace. They are send off to the slaughterhouse and eaten.

Any of you out there fighting for a mortgage mod feel like that’s just what your bank would like to do with you?

Time to get over the delusion that your bank is going to suddenly wake up and start dealing with you in a professional and ethical manner as befits a valued customer and realize you are no more than one of millions of cash cows who have run dry.

 

 

Homeowner Wins Big Over Wells Fargo

Dear Wells Fargo:

We are coming after you, one screwed-over mortgage borrower at a time. Your deceit and fraud cannot be covered up forever. We just need a few more judges like Elizabeth Magner on our side.

Wells Fargo Slapped With $3.1 Million Fine For ‘Reprehensible’ Handling Of One Mortgage

(Not So) Happy Anniversary

March 23. 2012. Two years to the day since Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (says it) logged in the first set of paperwork I sent requesting my mortgage loan be restructured.

Since then, I have sent paperwork 24 more times. I have discussed aspects of my finances, my personal life, my job and my home with somewhere around 70 complete strangers whose employer is part of a bizarre cohort that seems bent on swallowing up every home in this country.

These “professionals” have dissembled, obfuscated, misdirected, disinformed and outright lied. They have played silly sophomoric games designed by their supervisors to prevent people from winnowing their way through the requirements to qualify for a modified loan.

And they continue to play these games and generally jerk me around at every opportunity. Including today.

Seems the latest little strategy is just to randomly schedule a trustee’s sale of my home even though I am in a “trial modification” program during which I have been notified verbally and in writing that foreclosure actions will be suspended. I just happened a few weeks ago to look at a website that is an official source of foreclosure info. (at least in Arizona) and there was my name. With a foreclosure sale of my property scheduled before the end of my first (fully paid up) month in the “trial modification” program. WTF Wells Fargo?

I wrote a letter asking just that. No answer of course. And did they remove my property from the sales list in a timely manner? Well, I guess if you consider the Friday afternoon before a Monday morning sale to be timely. And if you consider “suspended foreclosure process” to mean they randomly scheduled another sale in 30 days.

Thanks for the big helping of BS you gave me to mark our two-year anniversary, Wells Fargo. May we not have any returns, happy or otherwise.

Wells Fargo Misunderstands the Meaning of “Single” Point of Contact

I can’t believe Wells Fargo is still pretending that it actually implemented its “single point of contact” program back in June 2010.

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage executives are still lying to Congress that WF borrowers seeking loan mods have had the luxury of working with just one person all this time. And it seems our elected officials are still buying the lies … or, rather, selling out to them.

“One important lesson we have learned is that the home preservation and foreclosure process is complex and intimidating and can be difficult for customers to fully understand. We needed to provide more consistent and predictable service to our customers so they can be realistic about their options. We had to improve communication. Understanding this, Wells Fargo adopted a Single Point of Contact model for customers who are pursuing a loan modification or working with us to sell their home and avoid foreclosure. Almost two years ago, in June 2010, we began assigning one home preservation specialist to work with a customer on a modification from beginning to end. The Single Point of Contact model has reaped significant benefits for our customers and Wells Fargo by building a one-to-one relationship with customers in default.”

Testimony of Joe Ohayon, Community Relations Manager
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Servicing
before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
U.S. House of Representatives
March 19, 201

I was assigned my first home preservation specialist in June 2010. Problem is, since then I’ve had a total of 16 “single” points of contact!

Yes, in my case, apparently “single” means “sixteen.” And that doesn’t count the dozens of customer service queue people I have talked with, along with the folks who answer the phone in what used to be simple the “Office of the President” but has been renamed the Office of Executive Complaints or some such. At one point, way last summer, I counted that I had taken notes on phone contacts with 55 different Wells Fargo employees. It has to be closer to 70 now.

Somebody please explain to Wells Fargo and its legislative lackeys that “single” generally refers to one (1).

Mortgage Mod Fraud Goes On and On

This is for all of you who still think the people working hard for mortgage modifications and fighting foreclosure are just a bunch of “deadbeats” who “bought too much house” and are now “trying to get a free house.

And for anyone who still believes the banks’ nonsense that they really, really want to help more people save their homes, but those darn borrowers just won’t fill out the right paperwork.

Nonsense. It’s all about the money the mortgage loan servicer banks are raking in. Servicers make more money to foreclose than to modify a mortgage.

That’s right. It seems logical to think banks would rather keep borrowers in their homes paying even a reduced mortgage. Nope. The financial incentive is generally all on the side of foreclosure, in large part thanks to federal government subsidies.

From the interview:

“Has there been a rush to foreclose, in your view?”

“I think there has been a rush to foreclose. I think the thing that most made me upset is that you had people that qualified for loan modifications that were denied and went into foreclosure.”

“Lost their homes?”

“Lost their homes.”

“Lost their homes, even though they deserved modifications?”

“Even though they would have qualified and deserved a modification.”

Just as true today as when this interview was first run. Don’t believe me? Just read the long list of lies Wells Fargo Home Mortgage has told me during 17-plus months of mortgage mod nonsense. Is that how an honest company does business. I think not.

Meet My Wells Fargo “Single Point of Contact”

 

Introducing:
JessicaMichelleMarkLindaKathleenWanitaJeffersonAngela- KathleenJacobGaryKathleenJulianSheilaLarryAnneMarieSusan

Back in April 2010, just as I was initiating my first request for modification of my mortgage loan, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage’s soon-to-be-solo president, Mike Heid, told a subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee that the bank was a couple months into a policy of “assigning one person to manage one loan modification from beginning to end.

Then, in mid-November 2010, Alan Jones, operations manager of WFHM servicing, told another subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee that “this year we introduced a 1:1 customer service model to enable at-risk customers to work with one person from beginning to end on their home preservation options.”

In between those two pronouncements, I had spent three months dealing with a never-repeating series of customer service phone queue people. Finally, on June 14, 2010, I finally got connected with a person who actually gave me her direct phone line. She said she would be working with me until the review was completed. But that was not to be. Instead, my case was passed along to five more people – all of whom told me they’d be with me ‘til the end – before that review ended.

I made a second mod attempt starting just before Christmas 2010. This time I had three different contact people, two in the WFHM office of the president and one on the Congressional Support team (thanks to staff at Rep. Gabrielle Giffords’ Tucson office.)

Yet, on February 18, 2011, HousingWire reported that Jones, speaking on a panel, said that since June 2010 WFHM had “established a single-point of contact strategy where troubled borrowers are assigned to one loss mitigation representative.”

“The single-point of contact does work. It has helped to avoid foreclosures when the borrower has one person to call will filling out their documentation,” Jones said. I can imagine that’s quite true. I just don’t think it was happening anywhere but in the prepared statements of these executives.

You see, three days after Jones’ statement, I was informed the second review of my loan had ended. By that time, I had been assigned a total of nine different people as my “single point of contact.” Despite the fact that WFHM execs were testifying to Congress that they had been matching borrowers with a single contact person for the past year.

In April 2011, in response to a bit of largely impotent pressure from regulators, Wells Fargo and the other big banks vowed to fix the failing loan mod/foreclosure process. One of the key points was, you guessed it, agreeing to provide customers with a single point of contact.

Single Point Of Contact: Why Won’t Banks Pay More Attention To Homeowners?

A full year after Jones said WFHM’s “single point of contact” strategy was in place and a full 14 months after Heid’s testimony to Congress, I initiated a third mortgage mod review. Surely, by now, WFHM will have perfected this system to match up customers with a single contact person.

Or not.

In just six weeks, between June 15, 2011 and July 26, 2011, I had four (4)!! different people inform me and my legal counsel that they were the “single point of contact” for my case. Four! Here’s the list:

  1.  On June 15, 2011, the day the paperwork to initiate the third round of mod requests was faxed to WFHM, I got a phone call from Tanya Williams in the WFHM president’s office telling me that my case has been assigned to Gary Lingren, executive mortgage specialist in the president’s office, and he will be calling me in the next couple of days. He never did so and he failed to answer several voicemails from my legal counsel. He did, however, later order my case closed because I didn’t send documents in response to a letter that was never actually sent to me.
  2. On June 27, 2011, I received a letter dated June 21, 2011, from Kathleen Halifax, an underwriter in Loss Mitigation. In the letter, she designated herself as my “primary contact” on the “team dedicated to helping” me with my mod review. I never heard from her other than the letter, though another WFHM employee did manage to interrupt her in a meeting to get the list of documents Mr. Lingren needed but never bothered to actually call or write to ask for.
  3. On July 21, 2011 my legal counsel was called by Julian Long from the WFHM president’s office, who identified himself as our “single point of contact” for the ongoing review. He was the person who, just eight days later, notified my legal counsel that my request had been denied.
  4. But, in the meantime, on July 26, 2011, I received a FedEx package containing a letter dated July 21, 2011, in which Sheila Roberts, loan processor, describes herself as “your loan processor and dedicated point of contact for this program.” (Note that this letter was generated the same day Mr. Long was telling my counsel he was the point of contact.) Neither I nor my counsel has had any other contact from Ms. Roberts and I have no idea what her actual role might or might not have been in the review that supposedly ended three days after I got her overnight package.In her letter, she implied the review was just beginning and wrote that she would follow up with me at latest by Sunday, August 21, 2011, to outline the next steps in the process or request additional documents. I hope someone tells her somebody else completed the review already.

Somebody should tell Wells Fargo that “single” means “one.” And “point of contact” implies, well, contact. Communication. Exchange of information.

Instead, “single point of contact” seems to be a phrase used to placate Congress and the “regulators” and mollify the media while the loan servicers continue to play the delay and deny game with homeowners. In short, another scam.

Update 9/13/11:
Add name number 15 to my “single point of contact”
JessicaMichelleMarkLindaKathleenWanitaJeffersonAngelaKathleenJacobGaryKathleenJulianSheilaLarry

Update 6/2012:
Up to 17 “single” points of contact now. Although “contact” might be a bit of an exaggeration.

Bank employees can’t read a bank statement? Or add? Yikes!

So, here’s a little task for all you bright people. I’m going to do the following:

1) Give you a copy of my June 2011 bank statement for my personal account … and
2) Give you a copy of my June 2011 bank statement for my business account … and
3) Give you a copy of my profit-and-loss statement showing the total amount of payroll expense in June 2011.

In addition, I will also tell you that I am the only employee of my business; therefore, the entire payroll amount reported on the P&L was paid to me.

Your task, now, is to verify that the business did, indeed, pay me the amount (by check) that I say I am paid.

Just so you know what you’re getting into, I’ll tell you that the statement for the business account shows records for 19 transactions. Eight are checks, five are deposits, five are debit-card transactions and one is a bank service fee. So, to successfully complete this task you’ll need to look at the records of the eight checks. The personal bank statement details 38 transactions, four of which are deposits.

What’s the catch, you ask? Surely all this should take is looking at the amounts of the eight checks on the business statement to see which ones match up with the amounts in any of the four deposits on the personal statement, add the matching deposits up and then look to see whether the number you get matches the payroll expense amount reported on the P&L.

Simple, right?!

Apparently not if you work for Wells Fargo. If you work for Wells Fargo, it seems that one of the following might be true:

1) You don’t know how to read a bank statement.
2) You don’t know how to read.
3) You don’t know what the words “deposit” and “draft” mean in the context of a bank statement.
4) You can’t add, in this case, two three-digit numbers.
5) You really can do all those things, but your boss told you to pretend you couldn’t so as to further delay the review of a customer’s mortgage loan for modification.

If you work for Wells Fargo and are asked to perform this very task while reviewing a customer’s loan modification paperwork, you will fail. Or, at least, you will inform the customer that you failed, even though saying so will make you seem to be a complete incompetent idiot who shouldn’t be working in a burger joint, let alone in the Office of the President of a multi-billion-dollar corporation.

You will be required tell the customer that in order to verify her income, you will need her to send you copies of the checks that were written on the business account and deposited into the personal account. (Just FYI, there were two.) Because until you see those checks with your own eyes, you have no idea whatsoever what that customer’s income might be.

Ugh.

Just imagine how awful it must be to work for this company whose system for “reviewing” loan mod requests requires you to pretend, right out there in public, you are a complete imbecile. That would sure get old fast. (And even rate an entry in the My Bad Boss contest – a little humor to keep you from beating your head on your desk after reading about this bankster nonsense.)

Lied To & Duped … That’s Me.

“…homeowners who began the process of obtaining a loan modification did so with expectations set by the President’s speech, and they quickly learned that they had been lied to… duped… they had waited through Bush’s last year… they had held on as they waited for Barack Obama… the man of the people… as long as the people worked on Wall Street.

When they’ve attempted to obtain their loan modification on their own, they ended up angry at the banks, the government, and the president himself.”      ~M. Andelman

That’s me to a “T.” Naively wading into the mortgage modification cesspool expecting to be treated like a human being and knowing I met the criteria. Jerked around for 7 months before Wells Fargo could manage to complete the loan mod review (and turn me down, inevitably). Waiting in vain for the Obama administration, Treasury or one of the bank regulators to put an end to the loan servicers’ delay and deny games.

Disillusioned, angry and seriously considering taking up residence in some other country, if only I can find one not on the fascist track and run by the banksters. Still fighting until I can find that elusive place.

Read the rest of this excellent blog post from Mandelman Matters.

 

Mortgage Servicers’ “Customer Disservice” is Intentional

Following is an excerpt from my most recent letter to my state attorney general’s staff. Ever since I filed a complaint related to the way my mortgage servicer strung me along after I requested my mortgage loan be reviewed for modification, personnel from the Office of the President of Wells Fargo have been telling tall tales about all the reasons it was my fault the review took seven months.

The more these people from the president’s office say about their internal systems, the more confused I become about whether there is even meant to be any sort of rational system. It’s not as if this is rocket science. Handling large numbers of documents in an efficient and effective way isn’t fun work, but it is very ordinary work for large corporations like Wells Fargo, which probably employs at least a few people specifically trained and tasked to create, implement and monitor such systems. And it’s not as if mortgage modification was an entirely new concept. As long as there have been loans, there have been circumstances causing some borrowers to need to modify terms.

By the time I first requested a mortgage modification, the company was well into HAMP. So if there was intended to be a system for efficiently processing loan modification requests, I would have expected it to be up and running by then.

I have come to believe the disjointed, highly unprofessional brand of feigned incompetence that Wells Fargo and the other large loan servicers seem to have in common IS the system. I believe the banks fully intend to string people along, to play on their hopes and fears, to wring every last dime out of the borrowers and the investors and then foreclose. That explains very neatly why homeowners seem to have the same types of experiences with all the big servicers – the stories of “lost” documents, phone queue mazes, endless trial mods, two-track systems with foreclosure winning out over promised modifications are too much the same to be mere coincidence.

Why else would it be so difficult even to figure out what paperwork the servicer/investor requires, in what format and submitted when? That’s just a simple checklist that should be part of each loan servicer’s website, updated as needed using information directly from servicers, investors and anyone else overseeing the various programs. If your loan is owned by investor A and serviced by bank E, here are the documents you need to submit, here is the timeline your review will follow, here are the standards that must be met and here’s an actual human being you can call if you have any questions. Not. Rocket. Science.

Yet, WFHM can’t even get straight how often it requires borrowers to update income documentation to keep their loan mod reviews moving forward. From April 2010 to January 2011, I got 11 different answers to that seemingly simple question. (See Lie #14.) Were all 11 of those people just coincidentally incompetent? No. They were doing what their superiors, what Wells Fargo executives, told them to do.

Intentional “incompetence” explains why WFHM’s customer-service queue representatives are forbidden to either transfer a borrowers’ call to anyone else in the organization or to provide the borrower with any direct contact information for the people who are reviewing their loans. They can only log your question or request to be contacted into the electronic notes system, where it might be seen the next time someone refers to the notes and you might get contacted by someone who can and/or will answer your question. Or not. That kind of inefficiency in a mom-and-pop operation might just be believable. But for a multi-billion-dollar global corporation to operate that way in this age of information and technology absolutely is not believable, unless the inefficiency is built into the system intentionally.

Inefficiency and obfuscation by design explains why written communication from Wells Fargo has no signature or even a printed name of someone the customer can contact for further information. And why letters from WFHM generally provide no return address that is connected with a real human being and only a generic customer-service queue phone number.

None of this represents standard business practice as I was taught and practiced in several industries – publishing, insurance, finance, higher education. This is the new brand of “customer disservice” that seems to be endemic to big corporations.

None of this is an accident. Masses of fraudulent foreclosure paperwork manufactured by robo-signers isn’t a “technicality” or a “clerical error.” The banks weren’t “overwhelmed” by an unexpected number of homeowners seeking mortgage help. They knew exactly how many sub-prime mortgages they had on their books and they knew exactly how many borrowers whose loans they services were either slow- or late-pay customers. That’s just P.R. hacks trying to spin these systems banks implemented to intentionally derail HAMP and other programs that, at least on the surface, appeared to be aimed at helping average people adversely affected by the economic crisis those very same banks caused.

It’s the same insidious spin tactic that sticks the label “deadbeat” on people who jump through hoops for months to qualify for and then meet all the terms of trial modifications and then expect the permanent modifications they earned. The bank shills also chide those people who go to court to demand the banks abide by foreclosure laws and prove they have legal right to foreclose for just “trying to get a free house.”

Update 3/2012: HUD IG Report Released With Settlement Details Servicer Abuse Directed From the Top
Like I said. The BS the banks are putting borrowers through is an intentional, institutional strategy put in place by the top executives. Not just “paperwork errors” and “mistakes by low-level employees.”